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WE MAY HAVE TURNED THE ECONOMIC CORNER
A
fter the great Allied military victory at El Alamein in November 1942, over none other than Erwin Rommel – the legendary “Desert Fox” – Winston 
Churchill observed, “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” Perhaps the same 
might now be said of our regional economy. After eight years of piddling economic growth, it appears that Hampton Roads finally is poised for much 
better things. Let’s examine the details.
Changes In Output 
And Incomes  
Our estimate of economic growth in the Hampton Roads economy in 2017 is 
1.41 percent, only slightly higher than 2016’s 1.36 percent (see Table 1). Once 
again, we will grow more slowly than our historical average of 2.6 percent 
over the past 30 years and we will grow more slowly than the United States.1   
This is not thrilling news, but we also estimate that the value 
of our region’s nominal gross output will approach $103.17 
billion in 2017. If Hampton Roads were a nation, we would 
have approximately the 60th-largest economy in the world. 
Thus, some perspective is required.   
Earlier this year, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported that the 
region’s economy, as measured by real gross regional product (GRP), 
expanded at a rate of 3.71 percent in 2015. This followed a 0.73 
percent contraction in 2014. The difference between the two estimates 
was unexpectedly huge and we fully expect the BEA to revise this number 
significantly downward.2 At the same time, the BEA also estimated that 
Virginia’s economy grew by 2.41 percent in 2015. It further estimated that 
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan economy grew by only 1.27 percent. 
Since Northern Virginia accounts for approximately 45 percent of the 
1   Note that the 2016 economic growth number is our estimate and the 2017 number our forecast.
2   Post-completion of this report and prior to its release, the BEA will have revised the 2015 GDP data and 
released the 2016 advanced GDP estimate.
Commonwealth’s economic activity, it is difficult to see how Virginia overall 
could grow more than 1 percent faster than Northern Virginia. We don’t see 
that level of growth occurring elsewhere in the Commonwealth. One should 
anticipate revisions of these discordant numbers as well.
Graph 1 provides some historical perspective to our regional situation. During 
the first decade of this century, the Hampton Roads economy grew about 55 
percent faster than the national economy. Since then, the story has been very 
different and we have grown more slowly than the nation. The key to our 
superb economic performance in the first decade was expanding defense 
spending. Between 2001 and 2009, direct defense spending in our region 
grew at an average of 6.3 percent annually.
There is a similar story to be recited when we talk about median household 
income. In Hampton Roads, median (50th percentile) household income 
increased significantly until 2008, but since has stagnated. As one can see in 
Graph 2, median household income in Hampton Roads historically has been 
higher than that of the nation, but has been growing more slowly during this 
decade. The gap between the two has narrowed. Our regional median 
household income was 14.5 percent higher than that of the 
nation in 2010, but by 2015 was only 7.7 percent higher.   
Interestingly, when we focus on per capita income – income per person – it 
turns out that we now trail the nation in this regard (see Graph 3). Not only 
have we grown slower than the nation but also the average size of households 
in our region exceeds the national average.     
WE MAY HAVE TURNED THE ECONOMIC CORNER 5
TABLE 1
NOMINAL AND REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) GROSS 










2001 $54.04 $67.48 4.00%
2002 $57.38 $69.55 3.07%
2003 $61.74 $72.59 4.37%
2004 $65.41 $74.73 2.95%
2005 $70.45 $77.75 4.05%
2006 $74.99 $80.19 3.14%
2007 $79.00 $81.51 1.64%
2008 $79.85 $81.27 -0.29%
2009 $81.80 $81.80 0.65%
2010 $82.69 $81.67 -0.16%
2011 $84.27 $82.20 0.66%
2012 $86.79 $82.89 0.83%
2013 $88.51 $83.11 0.28%
2014 $89.87 $82.51 -0.73%
2015 $95.68 $85.56 3.71%
2016 $98.96 $86.73 1.36%
2017 $103.17 $87.95 1.41%
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. The data incorporate U.S. Department of 
Commerce personal income revisions through September 2016. The base year for real GRP is 2009.
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GRAPH 1
RATE OF GROWTH OF REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (U.S.) AND GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 
(HAMPTON ROADS): SELECTED TIME PERIODS FROM 2001 TO 2017*
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data on GDP incorporate latest BEA revisions in September 2016. *GRP numbers for 2016 are estimates. GDP and GRP growth rates 
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GRAPH 2
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME: HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2015 
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GRAPH 3
COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA INCOME: HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2015
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Recovery From 
The Great Recession
The Great Recession inflicted economic pain on Hampton Roads and we 
still are feeling some of this distress. The recession saw the sharpest decline 
in economic activity since the Great Depression. Initially, we were fortunate 
not to experience as large a decline in economic activity as the rest of the 
nation, but subsequently our region has recovered more slowly than the rest 
of the country.
Graph 4 reveals that as of April 2017, Hampton Roads still 
had not regained all the jobs it lost in the Great Recession. 
By contrast, this graph also tells us that both Virginia and 
the United States have recovered the jobs they lost, and then 
some. Graph 5 discloses that we still were about 3,700 jobs 
short of complete recovery by the end of 2016, but will recover 
all of our lost jobs by the end of the year if current trends 
continue.  
Economic change typically produces winners and losers, and such has been 
the case in Hampton Roads (see Graph 6). Sectors that have gained jobs 
recently include Health Care and Social Assistance, Public Administration, 
Accommodation and Food Services, and Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services. Losing economic sectors include Construction (an especially large 
decline), Retail Trade (continuing a long trend), Administrative Support and 
Waste Management, Information, Wholesale Trade and Manufacturing.
The data in Table 2 reflect the average weekly wage earned by individuals in 
the major categories we have cited and what has happened to those wages 
over the space of a decade. Broadly speaking, the sectors that have been 
losing jobs also have been experiencing declining wages. The lesson is that 
stagnant or declining demand for an industry’s products is a recipe for slow 
wage growth. On the other hand, when industries are expanding, they must 
compete to attract and retain workers and this usually leads to larger wage 
increases.
Hampton Roads is not a high-wage region in any case. In May 2016, the 
average hourly wage (all occupations) in our region was 6.8 percent below the 
national average.3 In a subsequent chapter, we will explore whether this might 
be one reason why our region has experienced a net out-migration of residents 
in recent years.
3   www.bls.gov/regions/mid-atlantic/news-release/occupationalemploymentandwages_virginiabeach.htm.
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GRAPH 4
RECESSION RECOVERY IN THE U.S., VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS MEASURED BY TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2017* 
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GRAPH 5
CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2016 (000S) 
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GRAPH 6
CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS IN HAMPTON ROADS 
FROM 1ST QUARTER 2007 TO 1ST QUARTER 2016 (VIRGINIA PORTION OF HAMPTON ROADS)  
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Figure	6
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES: HAMPTON ROADS, 2007 AND 2016
Industry 1st Quarter 2007 1st Quarter 2016 Changes
Management of Companies 
and Enterprises
$1,268 $2,503 $1,235 (97.4%)
Finance and Insurance $1,093 $1,400 $307 (28.1%)
Public Administration $1,044 $1,283 $239 (22.9%)
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Services
$1,085 $1,277 $192 (17.7%)
Wholesale Trade $902 $1,077 $175 (19.4%)
Information $891 $1,048 $157 (17.6%)
Administrative and Support 
and Waste Management
$484 $632 $148 (30.6%)
Real Estate and Rental and 
Leasing
$671 $814 $143 (21.3%)
Health Care and 
Social Assistance
$716 $854 $138 (19.3%)
Construction $739 $876 $137 (18.5%)
Transportation and 
Warehousing
$867 $988 $121 (14.0%)
Manufacturing $1,075 $1,185 $110 (10.2%)
Educational Services $681 $781 $100 (14.7%)
Retail Trade $428 $478 $50 (11.7%)
Accommodation and 
Food Services
$258 $304 $46 (17.8%)
Utilities $1,313 $1,202 -$111 (-8.5%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Virginia portion of the Hampton Roads area and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
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Defense Spending
Total Department of Defense (DOD) spending in Hampton Roads almost 
doubled from 2000 to 2011, growing at about 6.3 percent per year, 
compounded (see Graph 7). However, DOD spending since that time has 
been stagnant and even has declined in some years. We anticipate that DOD 
spending in Hampton Roads in 2017 will be only about $50 million higher 
than its peak in 2012. 
The somnolent character of defense spending in our region has reduced the 
proportion of our regional economic activity that one can attribute to the DOD. 
Graph 8 discloses that estimated defense spending accounted 
for almost half of the value of our regional gross output in 
2011, but since has fallen to 37.1 percent. Given this change, 
we might be tempted to congratulate ourselves for having 
successfully diversified our regional economic base, but the 
truth is that our diversification is due primarily to sluggish 
defense spending rather than a dramatic expansion in our 
private sector.
What happened to military employment and compensation while defense 
spending was remaining roughly constant? Table 3 tells us that military 
employment (both active duty and reserves) shrank considerably in recent 
years and that compensation increases for those employees also tapered off. 
Indeed, the total compensation paid to all military employees in Hampton 
Roads has declined in the very recent past.
Fortunately, private-sector and nonmilitary federal activities have been much 
more energetic, with employment and compensation increases occurring in 
both of those sectors between 2010 and 2015. This helps explain why the 
proportion of our regional economic activity generated by DOD spending has 
declined by approximately 8 percent during this decade.  
Table 4 is revealing because it presents compensation data on a per-employee 
basis. Three important inferences can be drawn. First, both overall and on a 
per-person basis, military compensation per individual has stagnated in our 
region. Second, federal civilian employees in Hampton Roads 
constitute fiscal gold; their average compensation (a term that 
includes the value of fringe benefits) is more than double the 
private-sector average. Third, federal government budget sequestration 
rules that limit federal spending and federal government hiring freezes 
represent economic bad news for us. Whatever one’s views on the efficacy 
of federal spending, it remains true that the typical federal civilian jobs in 
our region are quite valuable. Moves to reduce the federal workforce would 
undoubtedly negatively impact our region.  
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GRAPH 7
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING: HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2017 
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GRAPH 8
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOD SPENDING: HAMPTON ROADS, 1984-2017 
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TABLE 3
GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) 
FOR MILITARY, FEDERAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE NONFARM SECTORS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 









Military Employment -21.3% -13.6% -9.9% 0.1%
Military Compensation 5.9% 61.6% -6.7% -0.2%
Federal Civilian              
Government Employment




11.0% 68.6% 27.8% 10.6%
Private Nonfarm 
Employment
22.3% 5.1% 6.3% 1.9%
Private Nonfarm 
Compensation
69.3% 36.4% 17.4% 4.1%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
*BEA chooses to label compensation as earnings.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED AVERAGE COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) 
IN SELECTED CATEGORIES: HAMPTON ROADS, 2014 AND 2015
Earnings in 2014 Earnings in 2015 Percent Change 2014 to 2015
Military $91,531 $91,283 -0.27%
Federal Civilian Government Employees $103,583 $107,521 3.80%
State and Local Government Employees $59,150 $61,088 3.28%
Private Nonfarm $41,279 $42,185 2.19%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
*BEA chooses to label compensation as earnings. 
Data updated on Nov. 17, 2016.
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A Closer Look At 
Defense Spending
The data we have presented thus far concerning DOD spending in Hampton 
Roads signal that this spending no longer is the powerful economic growth 
engine for us that it used to be. Even so, Graph 9, which portrays discretionary 
defense spending caps for fiscal years 2012 through 2021 as amended, 
suggests that defense spending could increase in the future. There are 
significant hurdles, however, to overcome before we see increases in defense 
spending in Hampton Roads.
As Graph 9 illustrates, there have been several major “budget deals” done by 
Congress to diminish the impact of sequestration spending limits on favorite 
Congressional programs, one of which is national defense. The Budget Control 
Act (BCA) of 2011 set the original spending caps. The Bipartisan Budget Act 
(BBA) of 2013 provided $63 billion in sequestration relief in FY 2014 and FY 
2015, split evenly among defense and nondefense discretionary accounts. 
Specifically, this act increased the defense discretionary spending cap from 
$498 billion to $520 billion for FY 2014 and from $512 billion to $521 billion 
for FY 2015. In addition, nondefense discretionary spending increased from 
$469 billion to $491 billion for FY 2014 and from $483 billion to $492 billion 
for FY 2015. 
Congress came back to the trough once again via the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2015 and agreed to pass sequester financial relief for FY 2016 and FY 2017. 
This relaxation raised the discretionary defense-spending cap from $521 
billion in FY 2015 to $548 billion (5.18 percent) for FY 2016 and by another 
$3 billion for FY 2017. Current law extends these caps through FY 2025.
It does not take a Nobel Prize winner to observe that in the current political 
milieu, it is difficult to determine the outcome of the budget debate. Congress 
must not only approve an increase in the debt ceiling and pass a budget law 
(which will set the table for any tax reform efforts), but must also reconcile 
competing defense authorization and appropriation bills. The numbers 
involved are not trivial. There may not be enough time in the legislative 
calendar to reconcile the significant differences in policy and spending 
between the House and the Senate.
Comparing the authorization and appropriation bills sheds light on these 
differences. The BCA’s cap on national defense discretionary budget authority 
for FY 2018 is $549 billion (see Graph 10).4 The president’s request for 
national defense in the FY 2018 budget was $603 billion, $54 billion above 
the BCA’s cap. The House’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) proposes national defense spending of $624 billion. While the full 
Senate has yet to act, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s NDAA proposes 
to authorize a base national defense budget of $632 billion. Regardless of the 
proposal, these levels are clearly well above the existing BCA caps.
Turning to the Department of Defense’s appropriations process, the president’s 
base budget request for FY 2018 was $574 billion, exceeding the BCA’s caps 
by $52 billion (see Graph 11). The House passed a defense appropriations 
bill in July 2017, setting the DOD’s base budget at $584 billion. On the 
other hand, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has set the 
DOD’s base budget at $513.1 billion. Senate Appropriations Chairman Thad 
Cochran noted that negotiations between the president and Congress may 
produce a new budget agreement, but added, “Until such time, however, it is 
reasonable that we move forward using fiscal year 2017 funding levels.”5
Given the significant legislative hurdles that must be cleared to fund the 
government, it is likely the federal government will enter the new fiscal year 
under a Continuing Resolution (CR). Over the last decade, the DOD has 
entered all but one fiscal year under a CR (see Graph 12). The most recent 
delay, for example, between the start of FY 2017 and the passage of a 
defense appropriations bill was 217 days, a delay only exceeded once since 
1970. CRs adversely affect the DOD, as the spending rate is typically limited 
to that previous fiscal year and, with few exceptions, new program starts are 
prohibited. CRs also result in the delay of maintenance programs (including 
ship repair) and reductions in training and readiness.
4   The National Defense budget function (050) consists of the DOD military (subfunction 051), defense-related 
programs in the Department of Energy (subfunction 053) and Department of Justice (subfunction 054). DOD 
activities have typically been 95 percent of the national defense budget request.
5   http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/analysis-senators-writing-placeholder-defense-money-bill.
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GRAPH 9
CAPS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, FY 2012 TO FY 2021 
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Caps	on	Department	of	Defense	Discretionary	Spending,	FY	2012	to	FY	2021
The legislated cap on spending 
increased by $27B (5.18%) during 
FY 2016 and by only $3B or 0.55% 
during FY 2017. It is expected to be 
$2B less in FY 2018. 
Figure	9
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GRAPH 10
FY 2018 – NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPS, REQUESTS AND AUTHORIZATION BILLS  
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
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GRAPH 11
COMPETING VERSIONS OF THE FY 2018 DOD BASE BUDGET 
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
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GRAPH 12
LENGTH OF CONTINUING RESOLUTION FOR DOD APPROPRIATIONS (DAYS FROM OCT. 1) 
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Looming over the debate on the appropriate amount of defense spending is the 
BCA. While members of the House and Senate have publicly acknowledged 
that the BCA’s limits on discretionary spending are well below Congress’ 
proposed levels, no action has been taken to amend or repeal the BCA caps. 
This means that even if Congress agrees to higher levels of FY 2018 defense 
spending, the president will be required to implement a sequester to reduce 
spending to the FY 2018 caps. Using the House appropriations bill as a 
reference point, for example, the president would be required under the BCA 
to order the DOD to implement an across-the-board 13 percent sequester, 
twice the amount of the FY 2013 sequester. To say that such a sequester would 
significantly harm the DOD’s operations is an understatement.
While the political climate remains tense and forecasting the actions of 
Congress and the president is fraught with uncertainty, we can draw on 
previous history for a bit of good news. The genesis of the BCA was the debt 
ceiling debate of 2011. Congress may tie a new debt ceiling deal in 2017 to a 
modification of the BCA caps that would result in increased defense spending. 
Those hoping for a large increase in defense spending, however, may be 
disappointed in 2017, as the proposed increases may not materialize until well 
into 2018.
Additional military spending may not translate to higher personnel levels, 
however. Military employment in Hampton Roads during the 1980s and 1990s 
approximated 140,000. By 1998, it had declined to 106,000 and currently is 
85,900 (see Graph 13). The DOD progressively has substituted equipment and 
technology for people. For example, the personnel complement of the new fleet 
carrier Gerald R. Ford is about 600 fewer than the older-generation carrier it 
is replacing.
The military services have also continued to express support for the DOD 
request for authorization to conduct a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
round in 2021. While Congress so far has not shown an appetite for another 
BRAC round, if other policies result in significant increases in the federal deficit, 
then we may see Congress authorize the DOD to close and realign bases 
to generate savings that then can be invested in force structure or readiness 
requirements. We remain cautiously optimistic about the role of Hampton 
Roads in national defense and continue to urge policymakers to be proactive in 
preparing for the next (and we believe, inevitable) round of BRAC.
The DOD is behaving very much like a private-sector business in this regard. 
Confronted with rapidly escalating personnel costs (especially 
related to health care and pensions), the DOD is automating 
and substituting technology for people. Faced with an 
abundance of infrastructure, the DOD is seeking to reduce its 
footprint to reduce costs. One should not lose sight of the economic 
ramifications of this behavior for our region. Falling numbers of active-duty 
military personnel will translate into lower expenditures on a wide range of 
regional items, from pizzas to new homes. True, increased DOD expenditures 
will be made on equipment and technology, but not necessarily in Hampton 
Roads. The change in the DOD’s mixture of expenditures does not bode well 
for us unless it is counteracted by an expansion of the fleet, or added emphasis 
upon special forces such as those trained at the Joint Expeditionary Base Little 
Creek-Fort Story.  
Taking a longer view, however, it is not a certainty that defense spending will 
increase significantly in Hampton Roads over the next decade. Graph 14 
models some of the possibilities (with the solid red line representing the current 
sequestration world).
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•  First, Congress and the president could agree on rapid and sustained 
increases in defense spending that raise national defense expenditures by 
5 percent annually (the blue dashed line in Graph 14). This could include a 
massive shipbuilding program to reach a fleet size of 350 ships; increased 
production of the F-35A and movement of the F-35B and F-35C into full-
rate production; Army and Marine Corps growth to match 2007 personnel 
levels; and new procurement to replace aging armor, helicopters and other 
weapons systems. 
•  Second (and what one might label a Hades scenario), Congress and 
the president agree on significant cuts to corporate and personal taxes 
coupled with large expenditures on infrastructure investment and defense 
expenditures. All of this occurs within two years. This results in significant 
increases in the federal deficit and stirs the fires of price inflation. The 
Federal Reserve reacts by increasing interest rates to dampen the price 
inflation. Bond yields spike upward and interest rates generally rise. (Do 
you remember the prime rate exceeding 15 percent early in the 1980s?) 
Over time, required federal government debt service payments crowd 
out discretionary expenditures, including defense. The end result? DOD 
expenditures eventually flatten and we enter a new round of base closings 
(BRAC). This dystopian world is represented by the dotted red line in Graph 
14.
•  Third, tax reform, infrastructure spending and defense spending compete 
for attention and resources in this future. Faced with this pressure, Congress 
modifies the Budget Control Act spending caps on a two-year cycle. The 
Navy remains at 300 ships and shelves expensive shipbuilding plans. The 
Air Force continues to buy the F-35A, while the F-35B and F-35C remain in 
low-rate initial production. While the downsizing of the Army and Marine 
Corps halts at current levels, no significant increases in active-duty military 
personnel occur through 2022. Once again, increasing fiscal pressure results 
in a new BRAC round that significantly cuts the DOD footprint. Facilities such 
as Oceana Naval Air Station go on the chopping block. The dotted green 
line in Graph 14 depicts this view of the world.
In the short run, however, potential increases in DOD funding are good news. 
For example, the FY 2018 budget for ship maintenance and repair may be as 
much as 12 percent higher than that for FY 2017. This will stimulate activity at 
locations such as the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (which is located in Portsmouth 
and one of the largest shipyards in the world), BAE and Huntington-Ingalls. 
The proposed increases in operational readiness, which include increases in 
the procurement of parts, supplies and maintenance contracts, will lead to 
increased regional spending. Looking forward, a new defense strategy and 
proposals for increasing the force structure will likely also increase shipbuilding 
and ship repair and maintenance, though we caution that these effects are not 
likely to appear until well into 2018 and 2019.  
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GRAPH 13
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2015
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GRAPH 14
POSSIBILITIES OF A CHANGE IN CAPS ON DOD DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, FY 2012 TO FY 2021 
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Possibilities	of	a	Change	in	Caps	on	DOD	Discretionary	Spending,	FY	2012	to	FY	2021
1). Good times are here again! or 
2). Remember the good times? or
3). Status quo becomes the new normal.
Figure	14
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Employment And 
Unemployment
Since the Great Recession, Hampton Roads has recorded unemployment rates 
higher than our historical average. Nevertheless, our unemployment rate has 
been lower than that of the nation (see Graph 15). However, the gap between 
the national and Hampton Roads unemployment rates has been shrinking and 
in April 2017 our rate was the same as the national rate. 
While the unemployment rate has fallen year-over-year in Hampton Roads and 
the labor force has expanded, the region continues to struggle to generate job 
growth. Recently released data from the BEA show that nonfarm employment 
has fallen over the last several months. The preliminary data for July 2017 
suggest that nonfarm employment has fallen back to levels last seen in June 
2015 .
Let’s dig deeper. Graph 16 tells us that initial monthly unemployment claims 
have declined considerably since their peak in 2010 and now are smaller than 
the prerecession low observed in December 2007. Most of the people 
looking for jobs in our region have found them. If there is a 
problem with this rosy scene, it is that the proportion of people 
of prime working age who have stopped looking for jobs 
has increased, both in Hampton Roads and nationally. These 
individuals are not counted as unemployed because they are not looking for 
a job. The net result is a curious combination of a falling unemployment rate 
even while we have a rising number of people not working.  
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GRAPH 15
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: U.S., VIRGINIA, HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2017 
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GRAPH 16
MONTHLY NEW UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 - MAY 2017 (12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE) 
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The Port
The Port of Virginia has continued to excel. Activity and 
volumes at the Port rebounded smartly from Great Recession 
lows and the Port itself now is being managed more efficiently. 
It has improved its handling of cargoes, is pricing its services 
more prudently than in the past and is welcoming capacious 
new ships that carry more than 13,000 20-foot equivalent 
units (TEUs). 
Graphs 17 (general cargo tonnage) and 18 (20-foot equivalent units) track 
port activity. Recovery from the Great Recession began to occur in 2011 and 
2012, and general cargo tonnage increased by 4.5 percent in 2016. Twenty-
foot equivalent containers increased 4.8 percent. Note that Port activity now 
consistently expands at an annual rate that exceeds the economic growth of the 
United States, Virginia and Hampton Roads.  
The Port has become one of the region’s more productive economic engines 
and a variety of studies attribute tens of thousands of jobs throughout Virginia 
to its activities. However, we need to note that its TEU market share in 2017 is 
slightly lower than it was in 2013 and that the Port appears to have lost market 
share to competitor ports such as Charleston and Savannah (see Graph 19).
Graph 20 contains good news, however, in the form of the Port’s increasing 
ability to serve its customers via rail. Such customers are far enough away from 
the Port that it usually is uneconomic to serve them via trucks. These “middle 
of the country” customers can be served by several different ports. The fact 
that the Port of Virginia is winning more of this discretionary business is good 
news.
Ultimately, the ability of the Port to expand and excel critically depends upon 
the Commonwealth’s transportation infrastructure (for example, the completion 
of an interstate-grade highway between Hampton Roads and Raleigh-
Durham); the continued dredging of the Port so that it can handle larger ships, 
and the modernization of its equipment and operational procedures, to name 
only several of the Port’s needs. None of these can be accomplished without 
significant investments.    
Reality is that the Port (and Hampton Roads) operates in a highly competitive 
economic world that does not stand still. More than most institutions in our 
region, the Port stands on the front lines of the competition. Either we move 
forward with the Port, or we will soon find ourselves moving backward.
The Port of Virginia announced a major expansion project 
that will provide momentum for continued growth and 
progress at its Norfolk International Terminal (NIT) South 
Optimization and Virginia International Gateway (VIG) 
II. The two projects attracted $670 million in support from 
the General Assembly. Therefore, by 2020, the Port will have 
the capacity to process 1 million additional container units, a 
40 percent increase overall.
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GRAPH 17
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE: PORT OF VIRGINIA, 1991-2016 























THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201732
GRAPH 18
PORT OF VIRGINIA HISTORICAL 20-FOOT EQUIVALENT UNITS, 1991-2016 (000S) 
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GRAPH 19
EAST COAST PORT MARKET SHARES OF LOADED TEU CONTAINERS, 2006-2017 
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GRAPH 20
MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS AT THE PORT OF VIRGINIA BY TYPE OF TRANSPORTATION, 2011-2016 
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Percent of containers moved by rail has gradually increased from 31.9%  in 2012 to 36.7% in 2016.
Figure	20
WE MAY HAVE TURNED THE ECONOMIC CORNER 35
The Hotel Industry
Three factors punished the hotel industry in Hampton Roads 
between 2008 and 2012. First, hotel patronage is sensitive 
to the general state of the economy and declined with the 
downturn in economic activity. Second, the number of hotel 
rooms demanded is visibly affected by the willingness of 
governmental units to pay for travel and, simply put, they 
stopped paying for as many employee trips. Third, both public 
and private bodies increasingly have been utilizing technology 
such as Skype to substitute electronic connections for in-person 
meetings.  
The confluence of these three factors can be seen in operation in Graph 
21. Real, after-inflation hotel revenues fell in Hampton Roads by $58.77 
million between 2007 and 2013 (17.2 percent). The industry has recovered 
admirably since then, but in 2016, real revenues still trailed their previous high 
in 2007 by more than $7 million. Further, the sudden emergence of firms like 
Airbnb as a competing factor could dampen further revenue increases.  
Another factor affecting the hotel scene has been the shrinking supply of 
hotel rooms in our region since 2010 (see Graph 22). To generate additional 
revenue from a smaller cohort of rooms, hotels must charge higher prices. By 
and large, the regional lodging industry recently has been able to push its 
prices upward, but further action in this regard is likely to be disciplined by 
new rivals such as Airbnb.   
The emerging prosperity of the hotel industry has not been shared equally 
across Hampton Roads. One can see in Graph 23 that since the turn of the 
century, relative to other cities, Virginia Beach and Chesapeake/Suffolk 
have gained market share, while Williamsburg (the Historic Triangle) has lost 
significant market share. The good news for Williamsburg is that the long-term 
decline may have halted. 
Perhaps the single most informative indicator of the health of hotels and motels 
is revenue earned per available room (REVPAR) because it incorporates both 
supply and demand influences. Table 5 reports REVPAR in several important 
regional markets, as well as for Virginia and the United States, in 2007 and 
2016. REVPAR in several of these markets (adjusted for inflation) remained 
lower in 2016 than it was in 2007. Virginia Beach and Williamsburg are 
exceptions. This could be construed as good news for Williamsburg because 
it is earning more “real” REVPAR on its reduced patronage. As Graph 24 
reveals, Williamsburg’s rising real REVPAR is the result of this submarket 
supplying fewer hotel rooms (down 16.3 percent since 2001) rather than 
a significant change in the number of rooms occupied (down, but only 1.3 
percent since 2009). Supply and demand is in much closer balance in the 
Williamsburg submarket currently than it has been for many years.      
Graph 25 focuses on the Chesapeake/Suffolk hotel submarket, which has 
gone through some particularly challenging times, primarily because hoteliers 
overbuilt capacity from 2004 through 2009. Only now is the demand for 
rooms in this submarket rebounding (43.8 percent since 2008) to utilize what 
otherwise have been large numbers of empty rooms. It will take several more 
years, however, before this adjustment is complete.   
TABLE 5







U.S. $65.55 $81.19 23.9% 7.0%
Virginia $61.91 $68.04 9.9% -5.1%
Hampton Roads $52.93 $59.46 12.3% -3.0%
Virginia Beach $64.62 $79.36 22.8% 6.1%
Williamsburg $47.47 $56.35 18.7% 2.6%
Newport News/
Hampton
$41.49 $43.47 4.8% -9.5%
Norfolk/
Portsmouth
$54.05 $54.68 1.2% -12.6%
Chesapeake/
Suffolk
$52.90 $49.93 -5.6% -18.5%
Sources: STR Trend Report, Jan. 24, 2017, the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics
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GRAPH 21
MONEY AND REAL HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2016 
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GRAPH 22
AVERAGE AVAILABLE ROOMS AND AVERAGE ROOMS OCCUPIED: HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2016
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GRAPH 23
ESTIMATED HOTEL INDUSTRY MARKET SHARES IN HAMPTON ROADS 
(MEASURED BY HOTEL ROOM REVENUE, 2000 AND 2016)
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GRAPH 24
AVERAGE SUPPLY OF HOTEL ROOMS AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED: WILLIAMSBURG SUBMARKET, 2001-2016 
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GRAPH 25
AVERAGE SUPPLY OF HOTEL ROOMS AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED: CHESAPEAKE/SUFFOLK SUBMARKET, 2001-2016 
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Housing
If one focuses on indicators such as the number of sales, sales prices and 
inventories, then the Hampton Roads housing market is exhibiting visible 
signs of recovery from the dual impact of the Great Recession and federal 
government spending sequestration. Even so, it is fair to note that our recovery 
typically has not been as robust as that experienced in the rest of the country.  
SALES PRICES OF EXISTING HOMES
Let’s begin our analysis by looking at sales prices, which have increased 
moderately every year since 2011 (see Table 6). Nevertheless, by the 
first quarter of 2017, our region’s median sales price for 
existing single-family homes still was 13 percent below the 
peak observed in the third quarter of 2007. At the end of the day, 
home purchases are tightly tied to jobs and the mediocre job creation of our 
region in recent years has put a serious damper on the demand for homes.
MORE HOMES ARE BEING SOLD – AND MORE QUICKLY
Nevertheless, more homes are being sold and newly listed homes do not 
remain on the market as long as in past years (see Graph 26). Additionally, 
the average number of months a newly listed home remains on the market 
before being sold has declined to 4.77, well below our long-term average of 
5.64 (Graph 27). No one close to the housing market, however, is mistaking 
our current situation for the “go-go” real estate boom of 2004 to 2006.  
TABLE 6
MEDIAN SALES PRICE OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2002-2016


















Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
(information deemed reliable but not guaranteed) 
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GRAPH 26
EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS ON THE MARKET: HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2016 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (information deemed reliable but not guaranteed)
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Homes Sold Average Days on Market
Existing Residential Homes Sold and verage Days on the Market:
Hampton Roads, 2000-2016
Figure	26
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GRAPH 27
ESTIMATED MONTHS OF SUPPLY OF EXISTING HOMES: HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 1996 – MAY 2017 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (information deemed reliable but not guaranteed)
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THE ISSUE OF DISTRESSED HOMES
Lurking in the housing market background is the continuing presence of a 
significant number of bank-owned and short sale homes, which often are 
labeled “distressed” homes. These are homes that financial institutions have 
foreclosed upon, or where for a variety of reasons owners have had to sell 
their properties under distressed circumstances. Not infrequently, the unhappy 
homeowners found themselves “underwater” – that is, they owed more on their 
mortgages than their properties were worth. The relevant point is that when 
these properties are placed on the market, they tend to depress housing prices, 
both because their sellers are anxious to get rid of them and some of these 
homes are not in tip-top shape.  
The good news is that the number of housing foreclosures in 
Hampton Roads has declined significantly (see Graph 28) and 
that the total number of distressed homes listed for sale also 
has fallen noticeably (Graph 29). What is unknown, however, is 
how much “hidden” inventory of these “distressed” homes banks, financial 
institutions and individuals still are holding that they have not fed into the 
market because of the still modest recovery in housing prices. 
What we can say with confidence, however, is that when distressed homes 
are sold, their sales prices are well below those of other homes. Hence, they 
constitute a visible drag on the housing market and are an important reason 
why housing prices have not recovered more energetically. Table 7 provides 
some detail. In 2016, the average sales price of a bank-owned home was only 
51.5 percent of non-distressed home sales prices, while the average sales price 
of a short sale home was only 67.3 percent of non-distressed home prices.  
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GRAPH 28
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006-2016 
Sources: ATTOM Data Solutions, formerly known as RealtyTrac, and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project















Foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads decreased by 2.6% in 2016, compared 
to an increase of 5.9 % for the Commonwealth. Filings in Hampton Roads in 
2016 were 50% below their peak in 2010. 
Hampton	Roads	Residential	Foreclosure	Filings,	2006	to	2016
Figure	28
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GRAPH 29
TOTAL NUMBER OF DISTRESSED HOMES (BANK-OWNED AND SHORT SALE) 
ON THE MARKET: HAMPTON ROADS, JUNE 2008 - MAY 2017
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE PRICE OF EXISTING NON-DISTRESSED, SHORT SALE, AND REO 





Short Sales Price % 
Non-Distressed Price
REO Sales
REO Price % 
Non-Distressed Sales
2006 $250,254 $241,666 96.6 $120,817 48.3
2007 $261,723 $237,897 90.9 $163,421 62.4
2008 $255,852 $239,110 93.5 $184,462 72.1
2009 $243,902 $239,913 98.4 $164,229 67.3
2010 $251,572 $231,211 91.9 $151,612 60.3
2011 $236,358 $212,967 90.1 $135,304 57.3
2012 $237,215 $187,527 79.1 $134,535 56.7
2013 $245,344 $180,001 73.4 $131,644 53.7
2014 $244,940 $171,745 70.1 $128,242 52.4
2015 $251,941 $174,577 69.3 $130,959 52.0
2016 $254,815 $171,432 67.3 $131,143 51.5
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (information deemed reliable but not guaranteed). REOs represent bank-owned homes. 
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IS PURCHASING A HOME A GOOD DEAL?
The answer to this question is yes. If a prospective buyer does not intend 
to move immediately and can obtain a conventional mortgage at currently 
offered terms and rates, then owning a home typically makes more financial 
sense than renting. Let’s look at the mathematics that leads to this conclusion. 
Table 8 compares the cost of owning to the cost of renting a three-bedroom 
home in Hampton Roads, and Graph 30 compares Hampton Roads to 
the United States in this regard. We include as ownership cost the monthly 
principal, interest and taxes paid for the median-priced three-bedroom and 
compare this total to the cost of renting the same. The ratio of ownership 
costs to rental costs is recorded in the last column of Table 8. One can see 
that the 2016 ratio was 1.38, indicating that renting was approximately 38 
percent more expensive than owning. While this ratio is not quite as high 
as it was in 2013, it still represents a historically favorable circumstance for 
owning rather than renting.  
Of course, the fact that owning is superior to renting does not matter if one 
cannot afford to purchase a home. The further good news is that existing 
homes in Hampton Roads have been quite affordable, at least since 2013. The 
monthly principal/interest/taxes payment for the median-priced existing home 
in Hampton Roads has constituted less than 20 percent of median household 
income in our region for several years and is now much more affordable 
than a decade ago during the housing boom. The continuing availability of 
relatively low mortgage interest rates is an important contributing factor.   
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED HOUSE RENTAL AND PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAXES FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2002-2016
Year
Median Monthly Rent for a 
Three-Bedroom House
PI&T Monthly for a Median-
Priced Existing House
Ratio of Monthly Rent to PI&T
2002  911 861 1.06
2003 1,037 890 1.16
2004 1,044 1,073 0.97
2005 1,087 1,315 0.83
2006 1,118 1,533 0.73
2007 1,164 1,598 0.73
2008 1,247 1,507 0.83
2009 1,236 1,307 0.95
2010 1,277 1,233 1.04
2011 1,319 1,071 1.23
2012 1,454 1,015 1.43
2013 1,570 1,080 1.45
2014 1,562 1,118 1.40
2015 1,530 1,154 1.33
2016 1,601 1,163 1.38
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Notes: A real estate tax rate of 1 percent was assumed and also that the mortgage tax benefit received by homeowners compensates them for their insurance and maintenance expenditures. The prevailing 30-year average mortgage 
rate was used for each year.  
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GRAPH 30
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR A MEDIAN PRICE RESALE HOUSE AS A PERCENT OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
MONTHLY INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1979-2016

































Housing Affordability:   Monthly Payment  for a Median Price Resale House as a 
Percent of Median Household Monthly Income in  Hampton Roads and the U.S., 
1979 to 2016
Figure	30
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Final Thoughts
Independent of defense spending, our regional economy is beginning to 
show signs of life. We have three major economic drivers in Hampton Roads 
– defense spending, tourism and the Port. Collectively, they account for 
about 55 percent of the value of our regional economic output annually. Two 
of these three (tourism and the Port) are expanding and the third (defense 
spending) might be on the cusp of an expansion as well, depending, of 
course, on congressional action.
Consequently, we forecast modestly increased economic growth for Hampton 
Roads in 2018 and 2019. Yes, we attach all the usual caveats to this forecast: 
Events ranging from trade wars and terrorism to hurricanes and a collapse of 
the stock market could derail our expectations. Nevertheless, for the first time 
in several years, our primary regional economic building blocks are starting to 
fall into place and better times appear to be on the horizon.     

